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1939] RECENT DECISIONS
where the cause of action arose within the state.13 "In the cases
where the jurisdiction of the state court was sustained there were
factors present which dictated the conclusion that orderly and effec-
tive administration of justice required the carrier to submit to suit in
the State where the action was brought." 14
While it is unquestionably true that repeated considerations of
the problem have made the criterion to be applied in these cases
"clearer",'5 it is still true that, to a great extent, the facts of each case
present a unique problem 16 -a problem that can be properly solved
when the court keeps in mind the necessities of "orderly, effective
administration of justice." 17
L.J.
LABOR LAW-N. L. R. B.-JURISDICTION-POWER TO ISSUE
AFFIRMATIVE OPDERs&-Defendants are public utilities engaged in
the sale of electric energy. Although not directly engaged in inter-
state sales of electricity, they supply power to public utilities, trans-
portation companies and departments of the Federal Government, all
located within the state but engaged in interstate operations. Charges
were filed with the N. L. R. B. by the United Electrical and Radio
Workers of America, affiliated with the C. I. 0., accusing defendants
of interfering with the right of employees to form or join their own
labor organizations, and of contributing to the A. F. of L. 1 Defen-
Harris v. American Ry. Express Co., 12 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. D. of C.
1926); Murnan v. Wabash Ry., 220 App. Div. 218, 221 N. Y. Supp. 332 (2d
Dept. 1927); N. V. Brood en Beschuitfabrek v. Aluminum Co. of America,
136 Misc. 349, 239 N. Y. Supp. 702 (1930); Erving v. Chicago, N. W. Ry.,
171 Minn. 87, 214 N. W. 12 (1927).
" See Farrier, loc. cit. supra note 6, at 381, 389, 390.
" Lehman, J., in Matter of Baltimore Mail Steamship Co. v. Fawcett,
269 N. Y. 379, 387, 199 N. E. 628 (1936).
See cases cited in notes 10, 11, 12, supra.
' See Matter of Baltimore Mail Steamship Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379,
386, 199 N. E. 629 (1936) ; Jensen v. United Air Lines Transport Corp., 255
App. Div. 611, 613, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 374 (1st Dept. 1938).
" It is necessary to keep in mind that this discussion is based upon the
assumption that the defendant corporation is within the jurisdiction of the
court .y due process, and the only question which is to be considered is whether
such jurisdiction casts so heavy a burden on the carrier as to interfere unreason-
ably with interstate commerce.
" See International Milling Co. v. Columbia Trans. Co., 292 U. S. 511,
54 Sup. Ct. 797 (1934) ; Matter of Baltimore Mail Steamship Co. v. Fawcett,
269 N. Y. 379, 199 N. E. 628 (1936).
149 STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (Supp. 1935) : "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer * * * (2) To dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
or other support to it."
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dants challenged the jurisdiction of the Board, contending its business
was predominately intrastate. While these proceedings were progress-
ing before the Board, an agreement was consummated between defen-
dants and the A. F. of L. union concerning wages, hours, arbitration
of disputes and recognition of that union as a collective bargaining
agency. The Board held these contracts to have been executed under
circumstances rendering them invalid and ordered that they be given
no effect. 2 The circuit court of appeals affirmed the Board's holdings.3
Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court, held: (1) The Board had
proper jurisdiction inasmuch as defendants' activities extended to in-
strumentalities engaged in foreign and interstate commerce and any
industrial strife resulting from unfair labor practices by defendants
would interfere with such commerce; (2) the Board had no power to
invalidate the Brotherhood contracts. The section authorizing the
Board to take affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the Act
does not confer punitive jurisdiction for their violations.4  Consoli-
dated Edison Company of New York v. N. L. R. B., 59 Sup. Ct. 206
(1938).
The jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B. extends to unfair labor prac-
tices which directly affect interstate and foreign commerce. 5 The fact
that a utility is operating predominantly intrastate does not exclude
the Federal Government from intervening when the intrastate activ-
ities have a definite and direct effect on interstate and foreign com-
merce.6 The application of this principle to the instant case is new
inasmuch as there is an intervening agency between the source of the
24 N. L. R. B. 71 (1938).
3 95 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
'49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(c) (Supp. 1935): "If upon all the
testimony taken, the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in
the complaint has engaged in or is engaged in any such unfair labor practice,
then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be
served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from
such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action, including rein-
statement of employees with or without back pay as will effectuate the policies
of this Act * * *"
'Id. § 160(a) : "The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice [listed in § 158
of this title] affecting foreign and interstate commerce"; Foster Bros. Mfg.
Co. v. N. L. R. B., 85 F. (2d) 984 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) (the purpose of this Act
is to prevent unfair labor practices in interstate commerce on the part of those
engaged in such commerce); N. L. R. B. v. Washington, V. & M. C. C. Co.,
85 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936) ; Agwilines v. N. L. R. B., 87 F. (2d) 146
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 88 F. (2d) 154
(C. C. A. 1st, 1937), aff'g, 15 F. Supp. 915 (D. C. Mass. 1936).
'Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833
(1914); Wisconsin Railway Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 257 U. S.
563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232 (1922) ; New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591, 42
Sup. Ct. 239 (1922); Stafford v. Wallach, 258 U. S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397(1922); United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup.
Ct. 570 (1922); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 Sup. Ct.




difficulty and its effect on interstate commerce, namely, the purchasers
of power from the defendant company. It might be argued that the
presence of an intervening agency no longer makes it possible that
the intrastate source of difficulties would be directly responsible for
the interference with interstate commerce. It is apparent, however,
that despite the presence of an intervening agency here, a strike in
the defendant company would have a most direct and disastrous effect
on interstate commerce.7 The case cannot be construed as standing
for the proposition that an intervening agency will no longer prevent
the Board from taking jurisdiction, where the source of the difficulty
is intrastate but eventually affecting interstate commerce. The court
found that the defendants' intrastate activities had a direct effect on
interstate commerce and this still remains the criterion in these cases.,
Whatever authority the Board possesses in the matter of taking
the affirmative action must be derived from Section 160(c) of the
National Labor Relations Act.9  It is this section which permits the
Board, after finding the employer guilty of unfair labor practices, "to
take such affirmative action, as will effectuate the policies of this
Act." 10 How extensive this power to take affirmative action is de-
pends on the individual facts of each case. In issuing affirmative or-
ders to effectuate the purposes of the Act, the courts have ordered the
disestablishment of company unions by employers where collective
bargaining was not possible and the policies of the Act were thereby
thwarted.11 Whenever it appears that a union is under the domina-
"The circuit court of appeals, upholding the jurisdiction of the Board in
the instant case, attempted to show the detrimental effect which industrial strife
in the petitioning companies would have on interstate commerce in these words:
"Instantly the terminals and trains of three great interstate railroads would
cease to operate; interstate communications by telephone, telegraph and radio
would stop; lights maintained as aids to navigation would go out; and the
business of interstate ferries and of foreign steamships whose docks are lighted
and operated by electrical energy would be greatly impeded * * * such effects
we cannot regard as indirect and remote." 95 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
"'Burdens and obstructions may be due to injurious action springing from
other sources: The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate com-
merce is the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its protection and
advancement, The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 564 (U. S. 1871), to adopt
measures to promote its growth and insure its safety, Mobile County v. Kimball,
102 U. S. 691, 696, 697 (1820), to foster, protect, control and restrain, Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1912). That power
is plenary and may be exerted to protect interstate commerce no matter what
the source of the dangers which threaten it."
'See note'4, supra.
x0 49 STA. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1935) : "It is hereby declared
to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substan-
tial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate
these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of
full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
ef their employment or other mutual aid or protection."
'N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U. S. 261, 58
Sup. Ct. 571 (1938), re7'g, 91 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937), (1938) 13
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tion and control of the employer so as to make it impossible to func-
tion as a true collective bargaining agency for the employees, the Board
may take affirmative action in the form of a disestablishment order or
an order compelling its non-recognition by the employer. Thus, one
criterion for disestablishment is whether or not the right to bargain
collectively exists.1
2
Under the Act, the Board's findings of fact are conclusive and
binding on the court if supported by evidence. However, subsequent
constructions of the statute have held that the evidence must be sub-
stantial.18 In the instant case affirmative action could not be invoked
so as to invalidate defendants' contracts with an independent labor
organization. There was no substantial evidence sufficient to support
the Board's finding that the contracts grew out of unfair labor tactics
or that giving them effect would thwart the policy of the Act.14  On
the contrary, the contract recognized the right of the Brotherhood to
bargain collectively for its own members.' 5  It thus appears that a
contract with a union which represents the free choice of employees
is valid when the power to bargain collectively exists.'8
The Supreme Court issued the above ruling although it found at
the outset that (1) the Brotherhood was an indispensable party to the
litigation; (2) the failure on the part of the Board to give them notice
entitling them to a hearing rendered the Board without jurisdiction to
invalidate the above contracts; 17 and (3) the validity of the contracts
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 178; N. L. R. B. v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 302
U. S. 679, 58 Sup. Ct. 577 (1938), rev'g, 91 F. (2d) 458 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
In re Atlantic Woolen Mills, 1 N. L. R. B. 376 (1936) ; In re Wheeling
Steel Corp.. 1 N. L. R. B. 699 (1936); In re Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co.,
2 N. L. R. B. 125 (1936); In re Shell Oil Co. of California, 2 N. L. R. B. 835(1936) ; In re Wallace Manufacturing Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 1081 (1937) ; In re
Cating Rope Works, Inc., 4 N. L. R. B. 125 (1938).
i"49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(c) (Supp. 1935) : "The findings of
the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." The
courts have interpreted the term "evidence" to mean "substantial evidence."
N. L. R. B. v. Washington, V. & M. C. C. Co., 85 F. (2d) 990 (C. C. A. 4th,
1936), cited supra note 5; N. L. R. B. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
303 U. S. 261, 58 Sup. Ct. 571 (1938.), cited supra note 11; N. L. R. B. v.
Wallace Manufacturing Co., 95 F. (2d) 818 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) ; N. L. R. B. v.
Thompson Products, 97 F. (2d) 13, 15 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938) ; see (1939) 13 ST.
JOHN's L. REv. 391.
" The instant case at p. 220: "Here, there is no basis for a finding that the
contracts with the Brotherhood and its locals were a consequence of the unfair
labor practices found by the Board or that these contracts in themselves thwart
any policy of the Act * * *." Ballston-Stillwater Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F.
(2d) 758, 760 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938) ; see note 10, supra.
"49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. A. § 157 (1935): "Employees shall have the
right to self organization, to form, join or assist labor organization, to bargain
collectively through the representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection."
"See note 12, supra.
" 49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(b) (1935). The court at this point
ruled in effect that this section, which authorizes the Board to serve only the
employer, has no application to a contract between an independent union and an
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was not in issue since they were entered into while the proceedings
were progressing before the Board, and the amended complaint failed
to assail the contracts. The court, however, chose to proceed in its
opinion, in a discussion of affirmative powers of the Board. Thus it
is not entirely clear on what ground the court bases its decision. It
may be said with some degree of certainty, however, that the holding
would have been the same way, had the court found proper notice was
given to the Brotherhood and that the validity of the contracts was in
issue.
P.M.L.
LABOR LAW-REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF N. L. R. B.-UNFAIR
LABOR PRAcTIcEs-EmPLOYR'S RIGHT TO HIRE ANY FIRE-FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH.-Respondent, a bus company, had a one-year open
shop contract with the union. During this time, officials of respon-
dent made anti-union statements.' After its expiration and during
negotiations prior to a second agreement, two employees were dis-
charged. The N. L. R. B. found they were discharged for their
union activity, while respondent contended that the true reason was
their repeated and flagrant violations of proper rules and regulations.
The Board found respondent guilty of numerous other unfair labor
practices.2 On petition by N. L. R. B. to enforce a "cease and desist
order" and an order of reinstatement, held, petition denied.3 (1) The
employer but only to those instances when an employer has created and domi-
nated a company union. N. L. R. B. v- Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
303 U. S. 261, 58 Sup. Ct. 571 (1938), cited supra note 11.
'One official informed employees that the union had nothing to do with the
act of the company in raising wages above those agreed upon in the con-
tract, adding that employees did not have to join union or "pay tribute" to
safeguard their rights. Another said that if he had a son he would not let him
join the union.
'See infra note 4. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 49 STAT. 452,
29 U. S. C. A. § 158 (Supp. 1935), provides: "It shall be an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer:
"1. To interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title (i.e., the right to self-organization
and collective bargaining).
"3. By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment, or any
term or condition of employment, to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization** *.
"5. To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of the
employees * * *"
' Order of ]Board that company cease anti-union acts of certain superinten-
dents upheld, even though respondent disclaimed all knowledge of, or responsi-
bility for them. N. L. R. B. v. A. S. Abell Co., 97 F. (2d) 951 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938); cf. Peninsular & Occidental S. S. Co. v N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 411
(C. C. A. 5th, 1938) ; Ballston-Stillwater K. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d)
758 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
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